zkLink Nova
Oct 28, 2026
An attacker exploited zkLink’s Arbitrator contract, which failed to clear a previously authenticated message hash after processing a claim. By reusing that hash through the publicly accessible SyncL2TxHashRelayer, the attacker impersonated an authorized gateway message and installed a malicious L2 logs root.
The attacker then submitted forged withdrawal proofs against the compromised root to drain approximately $783,100 from zkLink’s Ethereum bridge.
How the exploit worked
View reproducible PoCsyncBatchRoot under the gateway identity and installs an attacker-chosen l2LogsRootHash for a batch, after which withdrawals finalize against forged proofs that the real on-chain verifier accepts.
Lost: ~$783K reported across the two exploit txs. This PoC reconstructs the first tx, draining 22.431294525563808989 ETH plus 11 ERC20 balances (including 18,113.4…
Source: DeFiHackLabs (SunWeb3Sec)
- Target
- Bridge
- Classification
- Bridge & Cross-Chain
- Technique
- Cross-Chain Message Spoofing
- Attribution
- Unknown
- Chains
Event timeline
- Oct 28, 2026Exploit executed — $783K drained via cross-chain message spoofing
- Attributed to Unknown
- Recovery status Unrecovered 0%
Data credits
- DefiLlamaIncident record, amounts, chains, recovery data and logo
- DeFiHackLabsExploit analysis and reproducible proof-of-concept (by SunWeb3Sec)
